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The phenomenology of numinous or Being-experience in the later Heidegger is 
the focus in this third in a series of papers on a group of independent figures—
also including Jung, Reich, Toynbee, Teilhard de Chardin, and Simone Weil—who 
beginning in the crisis years of the 1930s envisioned versions of a futural “New Age” 
spirituality to address a globalizing materialism and its disenchantments—and so 
also creating a context for much of contemporary transpersonal and consciousness 
studies.  A preliminary consideration of Heidegger in the contexts of transpersonal 
psychology, religious studies, the macro-histories of Toynbee and Sorokin, James on 
“pure experience,” and spirituality as intelligence must also lead to some reckoning 
with Heidegger’s disastrous initial involvement with National Socialism.  Considered 
here in terms of a spiritual metapathology of narcissistic inflation/grandiosity, it was 
his way past this episode that led from the mid 1930s on into his radical critique of 
a globalizing technology of universal commodification and to an answering futural 
potential for a spiritual “Other Beginning” and “last god”—re-sacralizing humanity 
for the “guardianship” and “sheltering” of planet and life.
This study of Heidegger’s phenomenology of spirituality as the essence of a creative human intelligence and his analysis of a potential 
“Other Beginning” for a future planetary spirituality 
is the third in this series on a group of independent 
figures—in the crisis years from the 1930s into the 
1950s—who articulated overlapping visions of 
possible future resolutions to what the sociologist 
Max Weber (1922/1963) saw as a “disenchantment” 
of traditional meaning and purpose now intensified 
in the increasing globalization of an historically 
unprecedented materialist-sensate economy and its 
exclusively “instrumentalist” values (see also Hunt, 
2017, 2018ab).
 In addition to the existential phenom-
enology of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) these 
key figures would include the psychologists Carl 
Jung (1961) and Wilhelm Reich (1949/1973), the 
macro-historians Arnold Toynbee (1946, 1957) and 
Pitrim Sorokin (1957), along with the more explicit 
spiritualities of such as Teilhard de Chardin (1959), 
Simone Weil (1947/2002; Hunt, 2017), Krishnamurti 
(1973/1987; Hunt, 2014), and Gurdjieff (1975; 
Hunt, 2003) with their potentially futural versions 
of an essentialized Christianity, Vedanta, and 
Sufism.1 While they all offer intuitions of a more 
distant Age of spiritual renewal, they also became 
direct precursors and the larger context for what 
might be termed a present transpersonal Era of 
more specific empirical studies of psychedelics, 
meditation, neo-shamanism, and consciousness 
studies.
 The consideration of the later Heidegger as 
one of these New Age figures—with his intuitions of 
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Being-experience as the cognitive-noetic meaning 
of numinous-mystical feeling—might indeed 
seem questionable in light of his early allegiance 
to Hitler’s National Socialism, as Nazi Rector of 
his university in 1933/4. This has not surprisingly 
caused some to question the entire basis of his 
phenomenology of Dasein or human existence set 
forth in his seminal Being and Time (Heidegger, 
1927/1962; see Wolin, 1990; Hunt, 2003, 
and discussion below). Nonetheless, his rapid 
disillusion with National Socialism as spiritual “new 
beginning”—an enthusiasm initially shared by many 
conservative neo-romantics at the time—led to his 
abrupt resignation. What followed between 1934 
and about 1947 was a series of lecture courses, 
notebooks, and extended writings, some only 
recently published, in which he critiqued what he 
saw as the “machination” of modern technology 
and its ruthless commodification of both nature 
and humanity, which he came to see as common 
to the mass political movements of the 20th century. 
These writings also put forward what he saw as 
a potential spiritual renewal based on a futural 
global sacralizing of Being-as-such. This planetary 
Other Beginning was based on his original re-
interpretations of a pre-Socratic First Beginning of 
Western spirituality, which he, and others, have 
compared to Taoism and Buddhism (Guenther, 1989; 
May, 1996; Parkes, 1987). He also suggested a more 
regionally specific re-sacralization of nature and its 
mythology, which he derived from the nature poetry 
of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). This amounts to 
a kind of neo-shamanism similar to the related re-
enchantments of Emerson and Thoreau.
 Especially in light of the contemporary 
“populisms” of nationalist, fundamentalist, and 
narrowly ethno-centric reactions against the 
pressures and resentments of an accelerating 
economic globalization—a reactivity anticipated 
by Teilhard de Chardin (1964) as an inevitable 
way station on the path to any wider re-
spiritualization—Heidegger’s way out of his 
earlier National Socialist enthusiasm and forward 
into an original this-worldly mysticism and 
ecological re-sacralization will have its own re-
newed relevance—both in the mistake and in its 
potential answer.
Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Spirituality 
as Essence of the Human Condition
It is the cross referencing of Heidegger with these other New Age precursors, and the larger issues 
of social theory, spirituality, and the nature of 
consciousness this raises, that can best contextualize 
his unique understanding of Being-experience as 
the noetic core of the numinous and its relevance 
for contemporary transpersonal studies. It seems 
especially significant that Heidegger, with 
Wittgenstein one of the two greatest philosophers 
of the twentieth century, and both sharing a 
major impact in ongoing debates over the unique 
conceptual foundations of the human sciences 
(Hunt, 1995, 2005), offers a phenomenology of the 
transpersonal at the very core of his phenomenology 
of human existence.
Being-Experience and the Numinous: 
A Philosophy for Transpersonal Studies
 Following the earlier descriptive naturalism 
of Being and Time, Heidegger’s phenomenological 
writings from the late 1930s show a growing align-
ment of his understanding of Being-experience, as 
the direct intuition of the sheer thatness of Being-as-
such, with Rudolf Otto’s (1917/1958) more sensory-
affective dimensions of the numinous—Otto’s 
term for the feeling aspect of mystical experience 
also so influential on Jung (1961). For Otto these 
experiences of wonder, awe, and the uncanny, also 
the empirical focus of recent empirical research on 
awe (Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007), have been 
historically schematized in the multiple doctrines of 
a spiritual Absolute: variously understood as God, 
Void, Spirit, Brahman. For Heidegger Being-as-such 
becomes the deeper noetic meaning implied within 
these schematizations. 
Otto, a Protestant theologian drawn to a 
comparative phenomenology of the numinous as 
the felt core of the world religions, distinguishes 
within that a first dimension of the mysterium as 
wonder, fascination, mystery, while Heidegger 
similarly comes to describe his Being-experience 
with terms such as “wonder,” “awe,” “amazement,” 
and “marvelling” at an ineffable “wholly other” 
(Heidegger, 1942/1992, pp. 62, 75; 1939/2006, p. 
241). Where Otto describes his second dimension as 
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the tremendum, with its sense of the overpowering, 
dread, and uncanny strangeness, Heidegger begins 
to write of the experience of Being in terms of 
“shock,” “shudder,” and the “uncanny” (Heidegger, 
1942/1992, p. 101; 1938/1994, p. 133; 1940/2015, 
p. 89). Here Heidegger cites Nietzsche’s own 
descriptions of a “rapture” that “explodes” the 
very subjectivity of the subject in an “essence of 
joy” that must be “strong enough” to bear “being 
terrified” (Heidegger, 1937/1979, p. 123; 1940/2015, 
p. 89)—a duality of peak experience also described 
by Maslow (1962). Finally, Otto’s third dimension 
of dependency, humility, or “creature feeling” 
is echoed in Heidegger’s descriptions of Being-
experience in terms of “diffidence,” “indigence,” 
and “essential poverty” (Heidegger, 1941/2017, 
p. 93; 1942/2013, p. 182).
 For Rudolf Otto, as for James (1902) and 
Jung (1961), the “wholly other” quality of numinous/
mystical experience will at its extreme entail an utter 
“ineffability.” Here Heidegger describes a “keeping 
silent” (Heidegger, 1938/1994, p. 162) such that all 
verbal expression becomes at best “indicative” and 
poetic—full of overt self contradiction and paradox. 
Thus for Heidegger Being-experience can only be 
conveyed as a coincidence of opposites. It is at 
once the most “empty” and the most “excessive” 
and complete; the most “said” and “obvious” (as 
in the ubiquity of the word “is”) and yet the most 
“concealed” and “mysterious”; the most “universal” 
yet the most “singular” and “unique”; and “both 
utterly void and most abundant” (Heidegger, 
1946/1982, p. 193; 1941/1993, pp. 42–57). Heidegger 
will also describe Being, in its “withdrawal” behind 
the “gift” of its “welling forth,” as an ostensible 
“nothing”—and so reminiscent of Buddhist void and 
the “godhead” of Meister Eckhart—one of his major 
early influences (Heidegger, 1956/1958; 1962/1972).
 The mantra-like repetitions of these 
phrasings from his then unpublished notebooks 
(Ponderings II–VI, Ponderings VII–XI, Ponderings XII–
XV), lecture courses (Hölderlin’s Hymns: Germania 
and the Rhine; Parmenides; Hölderlin’s Hymn: The 
Ister; Hölderlin’s Hymn: Remembrance; Heraclitus), 
and then unpublished books (Contributions 
to Philosophy (of the Event); Mindfulness; The 
History of Beyng; The Event) are all written in an 
experientially evocative manner. These are the main 
sources for this present analysis, and offer the most 
direct support for the relevance of his later work as 
a phenomenology of spirituality and a philosophical 
foundation for transpersonal studies.
 Also central here is the link between Maslow, 
Almaas, and Gurdjieff on the transformation in 
sense of self in peak and ecstatic experience and 
Heidegger on Dasein—the essence of human 
existence as our self-aware “being there”—first 
developed in Being and Time (1927/1962). There 
he outlined the existential a prioris of the human 
condition as a being-in-the-world, as oneself, with 
others, ahead in time toward death—that openness 
conferring the sense of Being to which we can either 
“authentically” awaken or suffer a more everyday 
“forgetfulness.” Later he would write this as Da-
sein, connoting the direct experience of a presence-
openness-wonder in which one’s self identity 
becomes Being itself. That would be the beginning 
of the futural sense of identity that could prepare his 
“Other Beginning” for a planetary spiritual renewal 
(Heidegger, 1938/2012, pp. 277–279).
 Heidegger is on much the same ground 
here as Maslow (1962) on one’s identity as Being in 
peak experiences and self actualization. Heidegger, 
in discussing Nietzsche’s personal experiences of 
ecstasy notes this same transformation of self-hood 
as Being:
A being beyond oneself, hence a coming to 
oneself in the supreme lucidity of Being…
the heightening of life itself…a transformation 
in which the supreme lawfulness of Dasein 
becomes visible. (Heidegger, 1937/1979, pp. 
212, 216)
Almaas (1988) similarly describes the experience 
of “essential identity” or the “point” as one’s felt 
identity as Being, as also for Jung (1951/1959) on 
the Self, and as opening for Almaas into the more 
formless transpersonal states.2 Heidegger’s Da-sein 
also shares a conceptual framework with Gurdjieff 
(1975) on “self remembering,” as the cultivation 
of a here and now sense of presence that opens 
to the intuition of Great Being, and, with the early 
Heidegger, energized by the contemplation of 
death.
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 Heidegger’s awakening to Da-sein and 
its similarity to the Being-experiences in Maslow, 
Almaas, Jung, and Gurdjieff places them together 
as expressions of what Max Weber (1922/1963) 
termed “inner-worldly” mysticism—to be contrasted 
with the more detached “other-worldly” mysticisms 
and the socially driven propheticisms. It was inner-
worldly mysticism that Troeltsch (1931/1960) and 
Weber saw as the form of re-sacralization most in 
tune with the individualized, capitalist West (see 
also Hunt, 2003). More specifically for Heidegger, 
Being, as the noetic core of ecstatic states, is that 
schematization of the numinous most consistent 
with a civilization prioritizing a sensate empiricism 
of the “factual,” since it is the felt attunement to a 
sensed “thatness” running through all of physical and 
social-personal being. We really do exist, such that 
“Being-experience” becomes not a “representation” 
of something, but the fully embodied reality 
or “facticity” of presence-openness that is the 
numinous.
Heidegger and Religious Studies
 Both the very early Heidegger (1919/2004, 
1920/2013) and the older philosopher of ethics 
Max Scheler (1923/1960), inspired by their 
mentor Edmund Husserl, sought to articulate a 
“transcendental phenomenology” of the human life-
world as the next step in Husserl’s phenomenology 
of consciousness. Wilhelm Dilthey (1911/1960), 
also a major early influence on Heidegger, similarly 
sought a “deep structure” for the human sciences of 
“understanding,” which would have to be indirect or 
“indicative,” since unlike the “explanatory” physical 
sciences there is no objective “outside” to humanity, 
only its indirect expressions in history and culture. 
Both Heidegger and Scheler independently came 
to the insight that this categorical phenomenology 
for human existence already existed—expressively 
amplified outward in its most inclusive form in the 
world religions (Spiegelberg, 1965; Hunt, 2012).3
 Thus in the years leading up to Being and 
Time in 1927 Heidegger derived his categories of 
human being-in-the-world by a “de-mythologizing” 
or “naturalizing” re-description of the Christianity 
of Augustine, Duns Scotus, Meister Eckhart, and 
Kierkegaard. Christian love became the existential 
structure of care; original sin became the sense of 
inherent flaw, “falleness,” and forgetfulness of Being; 
and faith in eternal life the “authenticity” of being 
ahead of oneself in time toward the open unknown of 
death (Crowe, 2006; Kisiel, 1993; van Buren, 1994).
 Certainly one might wonder whether a 
similar “naturalizing” of Taoism or Vedanta would 
have generated these same universalizing forms of 
humanness, and Heidegger’s later use of the pre-
Socratics instead of Christianity did elicit shifts 
in emphasis. However, given the generality and 
orienting intention of these deep structures—being-
in-the-world, as oneself, with others, ahead into 
the care and openness of time—it would seem that 
while starting from Taoism would have elicited more 
emphasis on his eigenwelt (world-of-one’s-own) 
or from Confucianism, more on mitwelt (world-
with-others), neither would have led to anything 
completely “other.” Indeed, the validity of something 
like Heidegger’s Dasein is needed to help explain 
how cultural anthropology is even possible.
 The central implication is that if the 
existentials of being human are most fully derivable 
from religion, this also meant for Heidegger that 
religious/mystical experience must be a capacity 
inherent to Dasein—indeed as its “fullest” self-aware 
expression. A being with the structure of Heidegger’s 
Dasein would have to be capable of something like 
numinous experience. Being-experience becomes 
the closest our self awareness as such can come to 
the essence of human being-in-the-world. It makes 
spirituality not just a faculty of mind but mind-as-
such:
Man himself is that being that has the distinctive 
characteristic of being addressed by Being itself, 
in such a way that in the self showing of man…
the uncanny itself, god, appears. (Heidegger, 
1942/1992, p. 104)
 Heidegger’s approach to this intrinsic 
spirituality is neither purely “perennialist” in 
the sense of Huston Smith (1976), nor purely 
“constructivist” in the sense of Katz (1978), but 
more “interactionist”—as with Scheler (1923/1960), 
Martin Buber (1947), and indeed Otto himself. 
While Being as the noetic meaning of Otto’s 
numinous sounds at times like a perennial core, its 
“deep structure” of wonder, awe, gratitude, humility, 
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and communality is as general and unspecified as 
Heidegger’s original categories of Dasein. For the 
later Heidegger it is the schematization of Being-
experience, always shaped by culture, history, and 
society, that creates the “History of Being” he will 
trace forward into the possibilities of a futural Other 
Beginning and last god. Such a planetary renewal 
would then be a sort of pulling forward of the deep 
structures of the numinous through schematizations 
specifically reflective of the modern disenchantment 
of tradition and its economic and technological 
commodifications of nature and humanity, that is, as 
uniquely emergent in the currency of our unfolding 
world history. It would follow that the schematization 
of the numinous in this age of globalization would 
favor the “facticity” term “Being” over a previous 
Absolute, Spirit, One, or God.4
 Most simply put, to say that God is everything 
or in everything raises all the traditional theological 
debates over pantheism, dualism, monism vs. theism. 
For Heidegger, knowledgeable in both medieval 
scholasticism and contemporary mathematical 
physics, to say that Being is the essence of all 
things—a primary thatness running under, through, 
and ahead of all specific whatnesses—is true by 
definition. But then to say that this Being-as-such is 
the holy, and that fully felt it becomes the numinous, 
is to posit a spirituality of radical immanence—a 
non dual re-integration of humanity and universe 
that could then become the unitive meaning for the 
globalized sensate-material age to come.
Heidegger and Social Theory: 
The Multiple Histories of Being
 One way to better understand Heidegger’s 
rather unique “deconstruction” of the entire 
history of Western civilization and its futural 
globalization—in terms of an originary sense of 
Beyng (the English for his use of the archaic German 
Seyn instead of Sein) and its progressive distortion 
and loss—is to contextualize his Beyng-History 
within the broader context of other macro-social 
theorists such as Sorokin (1957), Toynbee (1957), 
and Weber (1922/1963). The latter all share an 
understanding of repeating cycles within the more 
linear socio-economic development of the major 
world civilizations—between eras or maximum 
sacralization and its countering secularization.
 Heidegger (1935/1961, 1946/1975, 1942/1992, 
1944/2018) locates his own First Beginning of a 
Western sacralization of Being-as-such in the pre-
Socratic nexus of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and 
Parmenides, which he will later compare to Taoism 
and Buddhism as its closest Axial parallels. This 
First Beginning he sees as gradually lost within the 
categorical certainty and predominance of a narrowly 
causal thinking culminating in modern science and 
technology. By contrast the pre-Socratics intuit an 
underlying unity of nature (physis), thought (logos), 
and truth (aletheia or unconcealment). All three 
concepts reflect the same “gathered emergence” 
of Being as a “welling forth” from a background 
“boundlessness.” This “self-unfolding” thereby 
“gives” an uncanniness and wonder to all specific 
beings, while “withdrawing” behind them in that 
very giving in an implicit concealment sensed as the 
holy. This for Heidegger becomes the early Greek 
sense of astonishment at the “pure shining” and 
“radiating light of all specific beings in their uncanny 
beauty” (Heidegger, 1942/1992, p. 136).
The emergence and concealment that dwell 
in all emerging beings, i.e. Being itself, must 
therefore be astonishing to common experience 
within everyday dealing with beings….The 
astonishing is for the Greeks the simple, the 
insignificant, Being itself. The astounding visible 
in the asonishing is the uncanny (Heidegger, 
1942/1992, p. 101)
 Heidegger’s admittedly controversial 
grounding of Western thought is already its 
own form of Weber’s immanent “this-worldly” 
mysticism—a first expression of the deeper 
renewal now needed as a planetary necessity in 
the face of what he feared might be its irreversible 
“forgetfulness.” Heidegger traces the breaking up 
of this pre-Socratic unity into what he sees as the 
characteristically Western dualism of subject and 
object, in which truth shifts from “unconcealment” 
to a dominating representation and causal control 
by a separate mind over an objective world. That 
dualism passed through an omnipotent Judeo-
Christian God of creation and Final Judgement 
into its eventual secularization as the modern 
Prometheanism of a scientific-technical “calculative 
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thinking” and “will to power.” For Heidegger, 
we have ended with an entirely secular, narrowly 
defined “anthropomorphism” that reduces Dasein 
to a kind of “super animality.” Corresponding to 
Weber’s “disenchantment of modernity,” Heidegger 
describes a “darkening of the world,” with its 
“flight of the gods,” “destruction of the earth,” 
“standardization of man,” and “misinterpretation 
of the spirit” (Heidegger, 1935/1961, p. 37). Where 
the “basic disposition” of the First Beginning was 
wonder, that of any futural Other Beginning would 
only emerge through a collective acknowledgement 
of this contemporary global “unsettlement” and its 
new dislocating sense of the uncanny (Heidegger, 
1938/2012).
 Heidegger’s History of Beyng can best 
be contextualized as a larger version of the more 
empirical observations of Pitrim Sorokin (1957), the 
Russian émigré social theorist who founded Harvard’s 
sociology department in the 1940s and 50s. His 
major work, Social and Cultural Dynamics, traced 
within all major historical civilizations a common 
cyclicity between “ideational” or “sacralising” eras 
of cultural inspiration and subsequent “sensate” 
eras of secularization. The latter result from 
inevitable historical changes in the socio-economic 
patterns whose resultant dilemmas in living are 
no longer resolvable within the original ideational 
schematization. Eras of secularization are reflected 
in the predominance of materialistic, pragmatic, and 
individualistic values—which then may be followed 
by fundamentalist ideational revivals, new religious 
movements, or a more nihilistic cultural decline. 
Compromise “classical” eras can sometimes bridge 
these extremes, as in Hellenistic Neo Platonism or 
the European Renaissance, wherein the developing 
sensate is still contextualized and subordinated 
within a larger ideational attunement. Heidegger’s 
version becomes one single macro cycle from the 
Pre-Socratics to modern technology, with Medieval 
Scholasticism as its classicism, and culminating now 
in the need for a global spiritual renewal.
 Sorokin independently agrees with both 
Heidegger and Max Weber, in the latter’s comparative 
sociology of the world religions (1922/1963), that the 
economic globalization of the modern West seems to 
have broken this pattern, perhaps permanently. The 
cyclic theories of Sorokin, Toynbee, and Weber are 
very different from the linear development models 
of Gebser (1985) and Wilber (1995), stretching from 
hunter gatherer shamanism to the present scientific/
informational civilization, while for Sorokin the latter 
is the unprecedented intensification and extension of 
an otherwise cyclic materialism—with what Weber 
saw as its entrenched “disenchantment.” Sorokin 
had concluded that by the early 1900s an ideational 
re-sacralization was long overdue, based on the 
preceding sensate culmination of the “Enlightenment 
Project” of reason, instrumentalism, individualism, 
and science, ending perhaps in Nietzsche’s 
relativism and nihilism. Weber (1905/1958) similarly 
wondered if the historically unique “rationalization” 
of Western society, its system complexity, associated 
with capitalism, technology, and bureaucratization, 
would permanently marginalize and suppress 
any periodic attempts at “re-enchantment” by 
increasingly marginalized sects and cults. Of course 
neither Sorokin nor Weber could have anticipated 
the run-away self-perpetuation of contemporary 
capitalist driven technology with its digitalized 
media, automated expert systems, and artificial 
intelligence.
 Meanwhile Toynbee (1957), aligned with 
Heidegger on the inherency of the spiritual in the 
human condition, and with his own conroversial 
radicalism, pictured world history as a succession 
of post-regional “universal states”—Greece, Persia, 
Rome, China, and India—whose “point” or deepest 
function had been their culminating generation 
of a still wider universal religion. Accordingly he 
anticipated that the same must eventually follow 
from a globalized materialist capitalism—which will 
finally have to give rise to its own re-contextualizing 
sense of meaning and broader spiritual purpose. 
With Weber, he saw modern capitalism as itself the 
further secularization of the Christian preoccupation 
with the incarnation of soul into a material world 
now becoming more and more unbalanced in its 
excessive materialism. He thought its futural re-
spiritualization would be a synthesis of Judeo-
Christian love and Eastern meditation, but one 
which would also have to remain consistent with 
modern empiricism and its this-worldly values. Here 
he turned to the later Henri Bergson (1935/1956) 
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and his understanding of mystical experience as 
the direct amplification of an intrinsic “life energy” 
or evolutionary “life force”—so close to Wilhelm 
Reich’s orgone energy as his “religion of the future” 
(Hunt, 2018ab).
 While Heidegger (1920/2013) was initially 
influenced by Bergson’s “religion as transcendent 
life,” he soon came to see that the unique self-
aware openness of human Dasein, contrasted 
with the “enclosed” worlds of all other living 
beings (Heidegger, 1930/1995), meant that Being-
experience was a species-defining calling out of 
humanity by Being-as-such—creating a mandate 
for our “guardianship” and “sheltering” of life 
and planet (Heidegger, 1947/1962). This became 
the basis for his Other Beginning and “last god” 
(below). 
Heidegger, James, and Consciousness Studies
 Heidegger understood his intuitive 
phenomenology of Dasein, Being, and Being-
experience as the fuller completion of his mentor 
Husserl’s analytic phenomenology of consciousness, 
which he critiqued as an unintended perpetuation of 
a more traditional subject-object dualism. Instead, 
Husserl’s intentionality or “aboutness” of immediate 
consciousness—so similar to William James (1890) 
on its “stream” or onflow—was to be understood 
as already rooted in a constitutive being-in-the-
world, rather than the other way around (Heidegger, 
1973/2003, p. 69). The structure of Dasein, its self-
aware presence-openness, makes Being-experience 
the nondual potentiality for Being to know/be itself 
through that Dasein.
 Heidegger’s “thatness” of Being-experience 
shining through the myriad “whatnesses” of both 
abstract metaphysics and everyday life was a more 
intuitive way of conveying what he had termed the 
“ontological difference” between Being-as-such 
and specific beings, with all their thereby imbued 
interest and novelty (Heidegger, 1939/2006, 
p. 240). The ontological difference is not a “faculty” 
of human nature, but the “basic structure of Dasein 
itself” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 369)—and as such 
determines an intrinsic humanly defining creativity 
most fully expressed in numinous experience. The 
wonder/awe/uncanny of this attunement to the 
thatness of Being, in making spirituality intrinsic 
to the fullness of Dasein, is thereby opposed to 
any “God of the gaps” notion that would see 
science as the ultimate replacement of a more 
vestigial, mythologically expressed and inevitably 
disappearing sense of mystery. Instead, the 
“wonder” or “strangeness” that things are at all 
continues to shine through all levels of their more 
specified explanation.
 It is interesting that the later William James 
arrives at a similar “thatness” underlying both his 
“stream of consciousness” and all that it is “about.” 
Influenced by his own phenomenology of mystical 
experience in his Varieties of Religious Experience 
(1902), he describes a “pure experience” or “thatness” 
implicit within the “thisness” of consciousness and 
“whatness” of world:
The instant field of the present is at all times 
what I call the “pure” experience. It is only 
virtually or potentially either object or subject 
as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified 
actuality, or existence, a simple that. (James, 
1912/1971, p. 15)
With Heidegger, it can be sensed as:
Wonder over the general fact of being,…it is only 
familiarity that blocks it. Not only that anything 
should be but that this very thing should be, is 
mysterious. (James, 1911/1996, p. 39)
In his accounts of nitrous-oxide experience James 
had already intuited this more primary sensing of 
being and time. He describes a “limitless, infinite 
feeling…a sense of existence” (James, 1890, 
p. 273) that feels “always having been there” and 
with no conceivable end: “The now…exfoliating 
out of itself yet never escapes” (James, 1902, 
p. 351). Amplified as such this becomes the “timeless” 
and “eternal” quality of mystical experience. James 
is intuiting here his own version of a nondual unity 
or monism (Bricklin, 2010) that is also fundamental 
to Heidegger and Eastern thought.
 Heidegger stresses that this wonder/mystery/
astonishment of Being-experience is not to be 
confused with a more ordinary novelty and surprise 
at the myriad “this’s” and “what’s” of the everyday 
life-world. Its “unusualness” or astonishment are 
not that of other “unfamiliar” or “exceptional” 
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experiences (Heidegger, 1939/2006), p. 110)—but 
something more intrinsic.
Only that which is unrepeatable … is the 
innermost law of Beyng. (Heidegger, 1938/2016, 
p. 202)
In short, Being is always unique. As such it becomes 
the inner form or deep structure of astonishment—
an intrinsic creativity of Dasein that separates us 
from other living beings. Here Heidegger naturalizes 
that more traditional Christian discontinuity of 
humanity and other species, contrastive against a 
purely Darwinian evolutionary continuity. 
One could also add that considered in a 
wider organismic context, Otto’s numinous with 
its wonder and awe of the mysterium, the wholly 
other power of the tremendum, and resulting sense 
of radical dependency, can be seen as the purely 
abstract form—brought forward as such into self 
aware experience—of the “orientation response,” 
in which animals exposed to novelty initially react 
with an absorbed fascination and “still reaction” 
prepatory to flight/flight or actual exploration (Hunt, 
1995). Indeed Heidegger confirms such an extension 
by adding to his primary “wonder” and “uncanny” 
a concomitant “shock,” “stillness,” “restraint,” and 
“shudder” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, pp. 14, 18). 
Here Being-experience would become the inner 
form of the organismic orientation response, but 
played through the entirety of our human self-
aware cognitive/affective schemata, and so bringing 
forward an intrinsic creativity in which all and 
everything can become sources of “fascination” 
and “mystery”—conferring that openness which 
Heidegger will term “capability for God.”5
Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Two Cognitions: 
Spirituality as Social-Personal Intelligence
 A major dimension of Heidegger’s 
analysis of Dasein in Being and Time was his 
attempt to reconcile Dilthey’s dichotomy between 
the intelligence of the sciences, as based on 
“explanation” (Erklarung) and grounded in a 
causal and mathematical connectivity—and the 
humanities, based on empathic interpretation 
or “understanding” (Verstehen)—with its most 
inclusive expression in the religious-spiritual 
traditions. (Bambach, 1995; Kisiel, 1993). For Dilthey 
(1911/1960) the human sciences (and their subject 
matter) were correspondingly oxymoronic—based 
on the emergent combination of what could be 
termed these separate intelligences of thing and 
person (Hunt, 2005).
 Although the two intelligences are distinct 
in terms of their ultimate intentionalities—witness 
the increasing distance between C. P. Snow’s (1959) 
“two cultures”—this author (Hunt, 2009) has 
argued that it is their necessary collisions and partial 
integrations that help to constitute the permanent 
creativity of human symbolic cognition—in contrast 
to their separation in the higher apes and apparently 
in more primitive hominids. Heidegger’s (1935/1961) 
version of this dynamic interaction and ultimate 
incommensurability comes in his inherent “strife” of 
“earth”—as natural environment—and “world” of 
culture. For Heidegger this strife, most directly felt, 
is the uncanny—that most primitive form of Otto’s 
numinous. Thus it is of particular interest that Freud, 
in his seminal essay The Uncanny (1919/1959), 
similarly understands the sense of uncanniness 
as the direct crossing of these intelligences of 
person and thing. It is the feeling that arises where 
physical objects are felt to have the expressive 
physiognomies of persons and animals, or persons 
are experienced as mechanized and thing-like. The 
latter becomes especially characteristic of schizoid 
and schizophrenic conditions (Sass, 1998), while 
the interpersonal psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan 
(1953) considered the extreme of this uncanny 
strangeness as the defining emotion of psychotic 
onset. Meanwhile for James (1902), Jung (1961), and 
Anton Boisen (1936/1962) full mystical experience 
becomes the latter’s resolution and healing.
 While the major multiple intelligences 
(linguistic, artistic, scientific, and mechanical) 
can be seen as variously balanced integrations of 
these ultimately separate primary intelligences of 
person and thing (see Hunt, 2009), these domain 
fusions normally entail an originating predominant 
context of the social-personal, whether explicit or 
implicit—even in science and mathematics. This 
predominance, while maximally expressed in the 
spiritual traditions, remains determinant throughout 
Sorokin’s sensate-materialist eras, to the point of 
truism, in the very necessity of social learning, 
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modeling, and mentoring for all knowledge—no 
matter how purely quantitative its outer form. Put 
most simply, the entirety of Piaget’s sensori-motor 
intelligence requires this shared context of “with 
others” for its integrated development.6
 On the level of the history of cultures, 
Sorokin’s ideational and classic eras—as well as 
the larger mythic frameworks of nature in shamanic 
peoples (Levi-Strauss, 1966)—would make most 
explicit and overt this contextual predominance of 
social-personal over thing intelligence. Indeed, it 
would allow their optimal integration and balancing. 
Its outward collapse in Sorokin’s sensate-materialist 
eras entails the slipping of the spiritually amplified 
social-personal back into the implicit—resulting in 
Weberian disenchantment and loss of any larger 
sense of meaning. For Heidegger, the present 
technological era and its economic globalization 
reflects an historically unprecedented skewing 
in favor of sensate-materialist “machination,” in 
which humanity sees itself more and more through 
machine and now digital metaphors.
In the face of that, and despite the semantic 
sense of Being as equally inclusive of physical 
universe and cultural world, it would appear that 
Heidegger’s characterizations of Being-experience 
make clear that his futural Other Beginning would 
indeed renew the same contextual predominance 
of the social-personal found in the traditional world 
religions.
 Thus, consistent with Gordon Allport’s 
(1961) classic account of the “idiographic” nature 
of the personal self, Being-experience is described 
as “unique,” “specific,” “self-same,” “singular,” 
and “alone” (Heidegger, 1932/2015, pp. 113–114, 
132; 1938/2012, pp. 51–56). Similarly Heidegger’s 
descriptions of Being as a “oneness,” “unity,” 
“wholeness,” and “simplicity” echoes the gestalt 
psychologist Solomon Asch (1946) on the way 
that individual traits in person perception are 
spontaneously synthesized into a unique gestalt, 
with its sense of a central essence subsuming more 
peripheral attributes into one self. Finally, and even 
more strikingly, the “appropriation” of Dasein by 
Being as a “sheltering” that “holds,” and “safeguards” 
(Heidegger, 1945/2010, p. 124)—a “giving” and 
“allowing” whose source holds itself back in favor 
of that very gifting—is the very essence of the 
psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott’s (1971) account of 
mother-infant mirroring and nurturance.
 This means that Heidegger’s Being—
meeting these long established criteria—is 
ultimately a kind of person. If so, does that make his 
futural Other Beginning merely anthropomorphic—
as in the projection of personhood within more 
traditional religious concepts of God, Absolute, and 
the compassion of Buddhist Shunyata. Instead for 
Heidegger:
The “anthropomorphic” objection immedi-
ately exposes itself to the most pointed counter-
objections….Behind it stands the conviction…
that everyone, of course, generally knows what 
man is….Does it not rather follow primarily that 
before everything, the question must be asked 
who is man?...Does man not exist in such a way 
that the more primordially he is himself, he is 
precisely not…himself? If man, as the being 
who is not only itself, becomes the criterion, 
then what does humanizing mean? (Heidegger, 
1936/1985, pp. 163–164).
For Heidegger the radical openness of Dasein—
metaphorically mirroring and mirrored by all 
of Being—means humanity is a “beyond itself” 
(Heidegger, 1937/1984, p. 102). As with Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999) on the physical metaphoricity 
of all cognition, it cannot be clear what becomes 
metaphor of what—the universe of us or us of the 
universe. The success of modern physics is based 
on a language of mathematics that has been seen as 
both “real” and a human “construction” (Penrose, 
1997). Meanwhile, the generation of humanity and 
its spiritual capacity by that universe—its giving forth 
of Da-sein—also makes that universe, to this very 
degree, anthropomorphic in itself—with humanity 
as its self awareness (see also Hunt, 2006).
 For Heidegger that leaves open an emerging 
ethical choice for that self aware openness between 
“guardian” or would-be despot.
Mendacity Interlude
Any consideration of Heidegger as major spiritual thinker must come to terms with his enthusiastic 
service as Nazi Rector of his university in 1933/4. 
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National Socialism and Personal Inflation
 Although Heidegger was not personally anti-
semitic (see below), he seems to have fantasized that 
he might become a leader of the social revolution 
side of National Socialism, which he initially saw as 
the potential spiritual renewal of the West (Ott, 1993). 
Meeting mainly derision from the more orthodox 
Nazi Education Ministry (Farias, 1989), he resigned 
abruptly in 1934, privately terming it “the greatest 
stupidity of my life” (Petzet, 1993, p. 37). Rejecting the 
twin extremes of later criticism that his Nazi period 
had no significant relation to his philosophy or that 
all his work is thereby rendered Fascist in its entirety 
(Wolin, 1990), it remains that the later recovery and 
extension of his larger phenomenology of Being 
does not mitigate the also insidious quality of a 
Nazi allegiance based not on any ideology of racial 
supremacy but a would-be spirituality. It seems most 
plausible to understand Heidegger’s Nazi episode 
as the kind of spiritual metapathology—here of an 
inflation and grandiosity—that Maslow (1962) and 
Jung (1928/1960) have seen as a vulnerability of 
modern attempts at a new secular or this-worldly 
mysticism. (For a more extended treatment of these 
issues in major spiritual figures, including both 
Heidegger and Jung, see Hunt, 2003.)
 By 1928 Heidegger was left with the 
sudden international fame of Being and Time, 
the recent deaths of both parents, and the end 
of his now notorious affair with his young Jewish 
student Hannah Arendt, who had also been his 
creative muse prior to its writing.7 He comes to 
see a “nothing” or absence at the core of Being 
(Heidegger, 1930/1995). Here he writes expressively 
of the contemporary forgetfulness of Being as a 
form of “boredom,” in the sense of a “queer kind 
of indifference,” “being left empty,” and “futility”—
very much evoking the schizoid diminution of “vital 
presence” that Wilhelm Reich (1949/1961) and 
more recently the phenomenological psychiatrist 
Louis Sass (1992) have seen as the reflection of a 
widespread loss of meaning in modern culture. His 
sudden enthusiasm as the first Nazi Rector of a major 
university and extolling of Promethean Will as the 
“first philosophy” in his National Socialist university 
speeches (Neske & Kettering, 1990), meanwhile 
shaving his moustache to look more like Hitler, 
would seem to justify his then friend the existential 
philosopher Karl Jaspers’ conclusion that he was 
both fatally “naïve” and “delusional,” and that he 
hoped to be a sort of “spiritual Fuhrer” or Platonic 
philosopher-king for the movement (Grunenberg, 
2017; Ott, 1993).
 This author will seek to show below that 
the larger significance of this period of grandiose 
intoxification became his path out of it—and its 
more contemporary implications. In his initial 
lectures and notebooks after his resignation he 
mocked the “mass rallies,” “dismal biologism of 
race,” “vulgar ethical materialism” of Nazi ideology, 
and the “brainless” appeal of Hitler’s Mein Kampf 
(Heidegger, 1935/1961, pp. 31, 39; 1938/2016, 
pp. 99, 104, 105). While acknowledging his 
earlier hopes for a “spiritual” National Socialism, 
he came to see the movement not as some 
renewal of civilization, but as the culmination of 
a false Western metaphysics of “will to power”—
the political expression of a commodification 
of nature and people that will destroy the 
planet. The lectures, unpublished books, and 
notebooks that follow from 1935 through 1947 
fill out his approach to a post-nationalistic, post-
racial “homeland” through the nature poetry of 
Hölderlin, along with his more abstract planetary 
intuitions of Other Beginning and last god. 
 With a few exceptions, these writings—the 
main focus of this present work—came to a stop with 
the shock of Heidegger’s post-war de-nazification 
hearings. He had, in his naivité, assumed that 
his resignation and lecture critiques would have 
somehow outweighed the notoriety of Germany’s 
most famous academic’s public endorsement 
of Hitler. Banned from teaching, and suffering a 
series of recurrent depressions, he went through a 
“breakdown” and brief hospitalization. Encouraged 
by Jaspers and some former students to publicly 
admit guilt and moral responsibility, he could only 
confess a private shame—which probably best 
explains his otherwise “notorious” postwar silence 
on the Holocaust.
 The vulnerability to intense shame, for 
the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut (1984), is part of a 
narcissistic weakness in sense of self that is consistent 
with accounts of his cold, austere maternal upbringing 
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and the desperate compensatory grandiosity of his 
Rectorship speeches. Where the guilt of a more 
cohesive self can be publicly confessed and so seek 
reparation, shame can only continue to hide, deny, 
and seek to justify—as he himself did. His wartime 
writings on a planetary spiritual renewal are largely 
replaced by more specific work on technology 
and the nature of thinking. He becomes bitter and 
more overtly pessimistic—saying in a late interview: 
“Only a god can save us now” (Neske & Kettering, 
1990, p. 57)—and so becoming his own example of 
Weber (1922/1963) on the “broken quality” of the 
heightened sensitivity of a this-worldly mysticism.
Brilliancy, Aloneness, Eros: 
A Further Cost of Genius
 The intensity and felt brilliancy of mystical 
experience, and indeed the ecstasy in all intense 
creative experience, require a certain capacity 
for aloneness and solitude that can also become 
intensely painful (Almaas, 2006; Storr, 1989). 
D. W. Winnicott (1958) understood the capacity to be 
alone as requiring a sense of selfhood rooted in the 
early maternal holding relationship, which becomes 
internalized as the dialogic matrix for later creative 
consciousness. When not securely established—
which it clearly was not in the early upbringing 
of Heidegger—the aloneness intrinsic to ecstatic 
brilliancy can intensify what Winnicott’s mentor 
Melanie Klein (1963) termed a schizoid loneliness—
as a felt futility, emptiness, and intolerable sense 
of absence. The spiritual metapathology that can 
then arise is a desperately felt necessity for the 
externalized erotic muse relationships that became 
so central in the later life of Heidegger—as also in 
the personal lives of both Jung and Wilhelm Reich 
(Bair, 2003; Sharaf, 1983).
 In letters to his wife, Elfride, written over the 
many years of his intense isolation during writing 
retreats, Heidegger describes something of the 
creative ecstasy he then feels:
[It is] like a revelation, an elemental force…
something unutterable…[in which] I am wholly 
and absolutely present…all alien distractions 
disappeared…what does “moment” mean 
here…it is an inappropriate designation…. 
(Heidegger, G., 2008, pp. 8, 66)
Yet these periods of isolation occasion an aloneness 
that would later lead him to a series of passionate 
affairs:
This dreadful feeling of isolation….An intense 
loneliness from the realization that no one can 
help…as one tries to find one’s way back…. 
(Heidegger, G., 2008, p. 84)
Indeed, his friend the existential psychiatrist Medard 
Boss (1988, p. 8) describes Heidegger’s outward 
appearance of deep depression during his periods 
of creative thinking—“as if wounded in some 
indescribable way.”
 Writing to his wife in some mixture of 
apology and would-be justification for the affairs 
that soon often preceded or followed his creative 
retreats, he says:
If my existence is without passion my voice falls 
silent and the source does not spring forth….
[The god Eros] moves me…when something 
long intuited is to be led across into the realm 
of the sayable and when what has been said 
must after all be left in solitude. (Heidegger, G., 
2008, pp. 254, 213)
He goes on to blame:
The manner of my early upbringing, inability 
in…the ability to trust, and then again 
inconsiderateness in the abuse of trust…
(Heidegger, G., 2008, p. 213).
The latter alludes to her own confession at the 
time of the birth of their second child, who had 
been conceived, during one of Heidegger’s writing 
retreats, in the arms of her childhood friend—which 
Heidegger accepted and forgave.8
 These letters do make for a sad and painful 
reading. Perhaps their larger significance rests in 
their demonstration, as also in the lives of both Jung 
and Reich, that a re-newed this-worldly spirituality in 
a contemporary sensate-materialist era would entail 
the continuity of soul and body explicitly rejected in 
more traditional “other worldly” religiosity. A radical 
openness to experience in-the-world will tend to 
revive a more neo-shamanic continuity between 
sexuality and mystical states (Tedlock, 2005; Hunt, 
2018b), with the actual phenomenology of ecstasy 
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in both more alike than different in any essence 
(Laski, 1961; Wade, 2013).
A Sad Banality of Genius
 That Heidegger was not personally anti-
semitic seems clear enough, despite his participation 
in the very political machinations of the Rectorship 
(Ott, 1993). After all, his mentor was Edmund 
Husserl, the Jewish originator of phenomenology, in 
itself a rare choice for a conservatively raised rural 
Catholic, and almost all of his most famous students 
were Jewish, later recalling the sharp contrast 
between his personal warmth and his fervently Nazi 
wife’s cold rejection (Neske & Kettering, 1990). 
So the more recent publication of his notebooks 
from the 1930s caused a deep shock through the 
community of Heidegger scholars (Farin & Malpas, 
2016; Trawny, 2015). Scattered throughout are the 
most stereotypical expressions of the cultural anti-
semitism all too typical of popular opinion in Europe 
of the day, but hardly what anyone had expected 
of one of the greatest independent spiritual thinkers 
of the times—and one whose writings had actually 
been denigrated by the Nazi Education Ministry 
as “Talmudic” (Falias, 1989). So there is the sad 
irony of these occasional passages on Jewish 
“cosmopolitanism,” “homelessness,” “calculative 
manipulation,” “empty rationality,” and a “dangerous 
international fraternity of Jews” (Heidegger, 
1939/2017, p. 153; 1941/2017, pp. 224–225). Was it 
embittered defiance that left him comfortable with 
their posthumous publication, and this after the very 
public reconciliation with Hannah Arendt? It is true, 
with Harries (2016), that removing all references to 
Jewish “homelessness” and “calculativeness” leaves 
his critique of modernity entirely intact, and which 
he never blamed on Judaism anyway. Yet what is 
one to make of the contemporaneous contrast of 
his praise in a letter to his wife of Martin Buber 
(Heidegger, G., 2008, p. 225) and then, after finally 
admitted back to university teaching, standing at the 
lectern and commenting that there were too many 
Jews on the faculty, while silently counting them off 
on his fingers (Farin, 2016, p. 207)?
 This is all entirely so stereotypically ordinary, 
stupid, and ignorant that it should not be seen as 
some Jamesian theopathy or Maslow metapathology 
of distorted spiritual realization. At most it reminds 
of Jung (1921/1971) on extreme onesidedness in 
development—say of a highly introverted intuitive 
thinking—as inevitably opposed by what he aptly 
termed its undeveloped, and so, inferior function—
here an undeveloped feeling taking the form of an 
abject moral obtuseness. Heidegger becomes yet 
another example of the larger issue in present times 
of how, or not, to separate a deeply flawed personal 
character from the actual genius of creative work.
Heidegger’s Way Forward: 
Toward Other Beginning
For Heidegger the first step past a globalizing, technologically driven commodification of earth 
and world had to be its full acknowledgement—in 
all its new uncanniness.
A Planetary Dilemma of Machination 
and Inner Homelessness
 Heidegger’s initial path into this under-
standing of global crisis comes from his series of 
lecture courses on Nietzsche between 1936 and 
1944 (Nietzsche, Vols. 1–4). Rejecting any approach 
that would see Nietzsche as offering his own 
futural understanding of a this-worldly spirituality 
(as in Noll, 1994; Hunt, 2003), Heidegger came 
to understand his own enthrallment with National 
Socialism as “a kind of hubris” (Olafson, 2000, 
p. 273) infected by a Nietzschean “will to power” 
that was the antithesis of the “releasement” into 
Being he now sought. Heidegger saw this “will to 
power” as the underlying metaphysic of modern 
Western culture—a narrowing, anthropomorphizing 
projection of an all-too-human domination onto 
the primary thatness of Being. Nietzsche’s would-
be “overman” of the future, who would will the 
affirmation of this ultimately meaningless “eternal 
recurrence of the same” in a “yea-saying” of 
Dionysian ecstasy, becomes for Heidegger a kind 
of distorted Promethean Homo-Deus—the very 
opposite of a more fundamental humility he finally 
came to feel in the face of Being as such.
Heidegger (1954/1977, 1949/2012) under-
stands the inner essence of this will-to-power and 
its universal commodification in terms of Gestell—
variously translated as “Enframing” or “Positionality.” 
Gestell in the German means a frame, stand, or rack 
which positions its instruments or tools in advance 
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for their use. For Heidegger this is the metaphor 
for a universal metaphysic in which all of Being is 
“calculable in advance” as measurable commodity 
or “standing reserve” (Heidegger, 1954/1977, p. 21). 
Enframing is still Being—what else could it be?—
but as a metaphysics of planetary domination it 
has become for Heidegger “something demonic” 
(Heidegger, 1949/2012, p. 58)—more recently best 
captured in the notion of the Anthropocene as a 
new human-made geologic age.
 Implicit within Enframing as the inner structure 
of modernity—and beneath its enforced forgetfulness 
of any larger context of Being-as-such—is a new 
form of the uncanny—Otto’s most preliminary of the 
broader dimensions of the numinous. While its sense 
of “strangeness,” “unreality” and “unsettlement” 
will be most commonly denied and suppressed, its 
fuller acknowledgement becomes the only opening 
to any futural Other Beginning. For Heidegger this 
new uncanny reflects a specific shift in the inherent 
“strife” of earth and world—in terms of the above 
discussion, as an unprecedentedly unbalanced 
collision/mergence between person and thing—
that core of the uncanny for Freud. For Heidegger 
a “thing” technology that ostensibly mirrors and 
extends human purpose comes increasingly to 
circumscribe and dominate that purpose—most 
clearly reflected now in artificial intelligence, 
automated expert systems, and an eventual genetic 
engineering.
 Here then is Heidegger in 1939:
The “miracles” of technology…enchant the 
human being, such that he arrives at the opinion 
that he himself dominates the miracle, whereas 
he has become merely the most submissive cog 
in a machine.(Heidegger, 1939/2017, p. 306)
This will elicit the felt “unsettlement” and 
“strangeness” Heidegger finds at the heart of 
a perpetual technological innovation—its new 
uncanny.9
 The German for “uncanny” is unheimlich—
literally unfamiliar, strange…Un-homelike. This 
usage becomes the bridge for the later Heidegger to 
his view of a globalizing inner “homelessness”—the 
felt loss of an “at homeness” and founded sense of 
“dwelling.”
The closure of the holy…lets all beings stand 
in the unfamiliar….The unfamiliarity of beings 
as such brings to light the homelessness of 
historical man within beings as a whole….The 
partly conceded, partly denied homelessness 
of man with regard to his essence is replaced 
by the organized global conquest of the earth, 
and the thrust into outer space. (Heidegger, 
1946/1982, p. 248)
This theme is most fully developed in his 1947 Letter 
on Humanism, where “homelessness becomes a 
world destiny” (Heidegger, 1947/1962, p. 287).
 Hannah Arendt (1978) in her later extension 
of Heidegger’s critique of “will to power” points 
out that the orientation toward perpetual novelty—
held well short of the more intrinsic wonder of 
the numinous—must in itself be opposed—if only 
implicitly—to all tradition. This is a view shared as 
well with Simone Weil in her last book The Need 
for Roots (1949/2002). One could add that this 
globalizing will to novelty has been doing more 
slowly to Western civilization what it inflicted more 
rapidly on colonized indigenous peoples—with 
the disruptions of their family structures, enforced 
re-settlements, and loss of culture and traditional 
spirituality. The result was the despair, suicide, and 
resort to numbing drug use and intoxication now 
also rampant throughout the capitalized world 
economy. One is left to wonder whether Heidegger’s 
essentialized inner “homelessness” of modernity 
may be destined for its own literalization in the 
globalized impact of a human-driven ecological 
crisis, with its widely forecast displacements and 
actual homelessness.
 It also seems relevant to note that Heidegger 
would have seen the present era of transpersonal and 
consciousness studies as risking its own deflection 
into a merely compensatory “subjectivism” and 
unintended commodification of experience. He 
distinguishes between experience as Erlebnis or 
lived experience—as also in current “altered” or 
“higher” states of consciousness—and Erfahrung—
experience in the sense of a cohesive and sustained 
meaning. The dualism of subject and object he sees 
underlying Western civilization, while manifesting 
outwardly in technological enthrallment, will have 
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its corresponding and compensatory over-valuation 
of “lived experience” for its own sake.
 Thus he warns against “psychic adventuring” 
or “intoxification” with the “alien,” “exotic,” and 
merely “unusual” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 109; 
1942/2018, p. 152):
The loss of the gods is so far from excluding 
religiosity that rather only through that loss is the 
relation to the gods changed into mere “religious 
experience”….The resultant void is compensated 
for by means of…psychological investigation of 
myth. (Heidegger, 1954/1977, p. 117)
So much here for James and Jung—and doubtless 
unfairly to those pioneers of a present transpersonal 
era. Heidegger will similarly reject what he sees as an 
“instrumental” attitude to spirituality as “intelligence” 
(as in Hunt, 2016), in which the holy “falls to the 
level of a tool in the service of others,” a “utilitarian 
intelligence” (Heidegger, 1935/1961, pp. 38, 40). 
From Heidegger’s perspective then, the current 
fascination with “peak” and “flow” experiences 
in extreme sports, mindfulness meditation in the 
service of mental health and “well being,” and 
LSD micro-dosing for creative business innovation, 
as in Kotler and Wheal’s aptly titled Stealing Fire 
(2017), would become the most extreme examples 
of a commodification of consciousness that while 
seeking to compensate the new “strangeness” 
actually blocks its deepening into the Erfahrung of 
Other Beginning.
 Here the “creative minority” Toynbee fore-
saw as someday moving toward a global spiritual 
renewal becomes just another “power elite.”
Hölderlin and Re-sacralizing the World: 
A Regional Neo-Shamanism
 Heidegger’s first positive step toward a 
re-sacralizing Other Beginning, beginning from 
the mid 1930s, was his developing interpretation 
of the nature poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin. He 
sees in Hölderlin the re-creation of an originary 
homeland for “Germania” by linking the expressive 
physiognomies of its rivers and forests with a Greek 
mythology of Olympian sky gods and chthonian 
maternal deities of ground and fate. For Hölderlin the 
animation of earth, sky, towns, and rivers through a 
Greek polytheism creates a kind of sacred regional 
geography. Hölderlin’s own by-passing of the 
Germanic Wotan and the Norse gods so central to 
a National Socialist romanticism allows Heidegger 
an understanding of “homeland” that undercuts 
the quasi-religious notions of race, ethnicity, and 
nationhood that he had come to criticize.10 There is 
a comparison here to Jung who in these same years 
was moving past his own initial fascination with 
a National Socialist nativism, so resonant with his 
earlier formulations of a separate Aryan, Chinese, 
and Jewish “racial unconscious,” to the more 
abstract metaphoricities of mandalas, alchemy, and 
a “land mysticism” of region and nature (see Hunt, 
2003).
 Heidegger now clearly rejects the mass 
movement of National Socialism as any kind of “new 
beginning” in the face of a larger “loss of the holy”:
The people of the country may not attempt to 
make themselves a god by cunning and thus 
put aside by force the supposed lack…of holy 
names. (Heidegger, 1943/1949, p. 265)
“The fatherland”…for the poet…does not 
mean some dubious greatness of an even more 
dubious patriotism full of noise. He means 
the “land of the fathers”…This people of this 
earth….” (Heidegger, 1935/2014, p. 108)
Instead Heidegger utilizes Hölderlin’s poetry of 
the rushing Rhine, with its “fury of the demi-god,” 
and the more gentle flow of the Ister (the Roman 
name for the Danube) to suggest the boundaries of 
an original “strife”—defining a “homeland” linking 
“heavenly fire” with a slower “planning” or “ability 
to grasp”:
[The Rhine]…is to plunge downward and 
from out of the force of such a plunge to be 
able at once to hasten away…The Ister by 
contrast appears…a hesitant whiling…almost 
backward flow…patiently alongside its [source]. 
(Heidegger, 1942/1996, p. 162)
In these rivers:
Land and earth are given limits of shape, and 
the homeland comes into being for…truth for 
the people. (Heidegger, 1935/2014, p. 204)
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Heidegger has in mind here something 
post-national and specifically regional. It can also 
thereby become a model for all other regions 
and peoples—much as Henry David Thoreau 
(1854/1982) had already attempted for the woods 
of New England. By broader implication, the 
Thoreau (or Hölderlin) of the Arizona desert, 
New York Finger Lakes, Midwest plains, and 
Northern California and Oregon coast will intuit 
very different “root metaphors” of these nonverbal 
levels of meaning. They are also the physiognomic 
patterns of Jung’s archetypes and the non 
reductive, non perjorative equivalents of his “racial 
unconscious”—the potential re-emergence of a 
regional neo-shamanism of the land as emblem of 
the sacred.
 Heidegger’s understanding of “the poet”—
who in “naming the holy” becomes a “demi-god” 
who loses himself in “bliss”—is clearly close to 
Weber’s this worldly charismatic mystic. In an 
age of radical secularization Heidegger’s poet 
is engaged in a “holy mourning” (Heidegger, 
1935/2014, p. 204; 1942/1996, p. 163). The poet is 
to “hold the ground” of “the no-more of the gods 
that have fled and of the not-yet of the god that 
is coming” (Heidegger, 1936/1949, pp. 289–290). 
Hölderlin, who suffered recurring schizophrenic 
episodes, reflecting also the deeply conflicted 
nature of a transitional this-worldly spirituality, is 
thus described by Heidegger as “struck down…and 
driven into the dark…by the excessive brightness” 
(Heidegger, 1936/1949, p. 285).
 This “naming of the holy” by Heidegger-
Hölderlin is based on the metaphoric embodiment 
and mirroring in feeling of the expressive 
dimensions of physical nature—of the light and 
darkness, dynamic flows, heights and depths—
evoking deeper non verbal emblems of Dasein. 
Rather than being some logical “domain violation” 
of “primitive thought” (Boyer & Ramble, 2001), 
the animation of nature in classical mythologies 
reflects the exteriorization of physical metaphors 
also implicit in the etymologies of words for feeling 
in all languages (Arnheim, 1969; Kugler, 1982) and 
spontaneous phrases describing felt emotion (Asch, 
1961; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In Heidegger’s 
version of this inherent metaphoricity:
We are tempted to say the sun and wind manifest 
themselves as “natural phenomena” and then 
“in addition” signify something further; they are 
“symbols” for us….As if it were not the reverse, 
that…the “things themselves” are already each 
time poetized before they become so called 
“symbols.” (Heidegger, 1942/2018, pp. 34–35)
The poet/mystic/shaman, in becoming the symbol, 
is being that specific dimension of the numinous.
 Marghanita Laski (1961) similarly describes 
the mediation of mystical experience by the “quasi 
physical sensations” conveyed by words for heights 
(soaring), luminosity (flashing, brilliancy), darkness 
(abyss, shining blackness), expansion (bursting), 
and words describing liquidity and flow (dissolving, 
melting, streaming). A. H. Almaas (1986) has 
specified these same cross-modal or synesthetic 
qualities in terms of the Indian chakras or Sufi lataif of 
the red of essential strength, the yellow of joy-bliss, 
the black of power as peace, the shining white of will 
as surrender/allowance, the golden melting of love, 
and the green of compassion. In the vision trance 
of shamanism (Eliade, 1964; Walsh, 2007) these 
chakra/lataif qualities are encountered outwardly as 
the expressive dimensions of nature—as in the play 
of light through streaming clouds mediating joy and 
serenity in Heidegger’s explication of the verses of 
Hölderlin:
The cloud…lingers above against “the silver 
heights”….the clear brightness…serenifies this 
lingering. What it writes, the “Joyous,” is the 
Serene….That which causes joy shines forth 
towards the homecoming poet….This pure 
lighting…the streaming lighting itself…we 
call the Serene. The Serene is fundamentally 
healing. It is the holy. (Heidegger, 1943/1949, 
pp. 247–248, 251)
As for Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Every natural fact is 
a symbol of some spiritual fact” (1836/1963, p. 12). 
 In his post-war essays, “The thing” (1950), 
and “Building, dwelling, thinking” (1951), Heidegger 
extends this understanding of Hölderlin’s sacred 
geography into a more general neo-shamanic 
understanding of an originary being-in-the-world 
as the crossing of two foundational dimensions 
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in the “foursome” of earth-sky and mortals-gods. 
This would be the metaphorically expressed 
deep structure of Dasein, in contrast to the more 
conceptual analysis of Being and Time, and as 
such, one can add, would be filled in differently 
for each culture and its metaphorized region. Here 
the pre-Socratic physis, or nature, is unfolded into 
the dimension of earth—as what “upholds” and 
supports in the guardianship of “dwelling”—and sky, 
as the horizonal openness of the meaning of sunrise 
and sunset so easily lost in any more astronomical 
“explanation.” Meanwhile, the pre-Socratic logos—
as the original openness of thought—unfolds into 
the dimension of mortals—understood in terms of 
Dasein’s being-toward-death rather than Aristotle’s 
animal rationale—and gods, as the mythic divinities 
that “animate” earth and sky. Mortals, open to the 
unknown ahead, are thereby attuned to the Being-
as-such whose reflection the gods must have if 
they are to exist for a community as “real.” Thereby 
the foursome is held open as the “inbetween” for 
a “roundance” of cross mirrored and sustaining 
meaning specific to each culture.
 Heidegger’s “foursome” can be seen as an 
independent essentializing of the anthropologist 
Claude Levi-Strauss (1966) on the elaborate multi-
dimensional classificatory lattices in the mythological 
systems of tribal peoples, cross referencing the 
specificities of local geography, seasons, the varieties 
of plant and animal life, social roles and clan 
structure, all linked to mythic stories of gods, spirits, 
and ancestors. The classical sociologists Durkheim 
and Mauss (1903/1963) had earlier located these 
dimensions as still implicit within the religious 
schematizations of world civilizations—seeing the 
Chinese I-Ching, with its juxtaposition of Taoist/
Confucian meanings with the physiognomies of 
nature, colors, geographical directions, and family 
roles, as one such more explicit survival (see also 
Hunt, 2011). These lattices of meaning—whether 
explicit or implicit—constitute the inner matrix 
of what Emile Durkheim (1912/1961) would call 
the “collective representations” of a communal or 
shared consciousness. This notion of consciousness 
as intrinsically “collective” is in marked contrast to 
the Western tradition of consciousness as individual, 
separate, and ultimately “private”—which for 
Heidegger is part of the alienation and “unsettlement” 
of modernity. The question for Heidegger, as for Jung, 
becomes the extent to which an originary sense of 
“at homeness” and “dwelling” might be recoverable 
through this kind of re-mythologized thinking.
 What Heidegger has done with his 
abstract foursome is to offer a new version of his 
deep structure of Dasein to counter the present 
globalization of a calculative mentality that can only 
understand humanity “biologistically”—ultimately 
as Nietzsche’s “super-animal.” Meanwhile this 
foursome would have to be specified differently for 
the distinct regional identities of different cultures and 
peoples. This offers a more grounded replacement 
for the current populist and ethnic-national reactions 
against the economic globalization that opposes 
these regionalisms—which began of course in the 
1930s with the Aryan would-be biologism Heidegger 
came to oppose. His foursome thus represents both 
a common humanity and a regionally specified 
“homeland.”11
 Heidegger would almost certainly agree that 
the present planetary crisis of climate change and 
ecological sustainability cannot be fully addressed 
by pitting one calculative instrumentalism—however 
rational human survival is as an issue—against 
another. There is, indeed, some emerging consensus 
that a more “non rational” re-sanctification of planet 
and humanity will be needed—despite the view of 
the scientific Enlightenment that all “superstition” 
had been left behind (Taylor, 1989). For Hawken 
(2007), in his Blessed Unrest, on the current 
gathering together of the initially separated issues of 
ecological survival, world-wide social justice, and 
the rights and traditions of indigenous peoples:
We cannot save our planet unless human 
kind undergoes a widespread and religious 
awakening….Fixes won’t fix unless we fix our 
souls as well. (p. 184)
This sounds very like Heidegger’s sacralised 
“guardianship” and neo-shamanic “sheparding.”
Other Beginning, Freedom, and Last God
In these same years, from the late 1930s, Heidegger also began to address a more abstract, truly global, 
level of a futural spiritual renewal.
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Inceptualities of Being: 
First and Other
 Heidegger pictured a globalizing “loss of the 
holy” as “the very twilight of the most monstrous 
transformation our planet has undergone” and “the 
dawn of an altogether different age” (Heidegger, 
1946/1975, p. 17). In answer, he sought a deeper 
understanding of the origins of Western thought in 
the Greek pre-Socratics in order to regain from that 
originating paradigm some intuition of a still latent 
Other Beginning to come. For Heidegger the pre-
Socratic First Beginning rested on Physis or Nature as 
organic emergence, an ever-arising unconcealment, 
in which Being surges forth as ecstatic “fire of the 
world” (Heidegger, 1943/1975, p. 112). By contrast 
he intuits an Other Beginning—implicative and as 
the yet unspecified within the first—in terms of the 
imagery of a “Clearing” (Lichtung)—with its potential 
for an emergent sense of openness, releasement, 
and freedom (Heidegger, 1938/2012). This openness 
or Clearing is also the basis for a futural Da-sein or 
sense of human identity—with humanity as the “in-
between” that holds open the Foursome.
 It may follow from Heidegger’s origins 
within Husserlian phenomenology that he implicitly 
models the relation of First and Other Beginning—as 
distinct historical ages of spiritual understanding—
on the inner unfoldment of thought itself. For Eugene 
Gendlin (1962), himself strongly influenced by 
Heidegger, the “felt meaning” in all thinking begins 
from an open unspecifiable “sense,” which can then 
unfold into more specific and sayable meanings. 
It is only then that one may or may not sense 
one’s understanding as cohering into a now fully 
specified whole. The initially inchoate beginning of 
any felt meaning is only fully understandable in its 
completion—as either fulfilled or needing instead a 
renewed beginning.
 Heidegger seems to be applying something 
like this model to the stages of a world spirituality. 
So it is only within the now better understood 
implicit ground of the pre-Socratics—illuminated 
for Heidegger through its final miscarriage into 
a globalizing mentality of calculation—that an 
Other Beginning for the sense of the holy might be 
intuited. That still deeper beginning is latent within 
the first—whose full understanding “does not reside 
back in a past but lies in advance of what is to 
come,” (Heidegger, 1942/1992, p. 1). Thus there is 
an intrinsic inner relation between: 
The First Beginning, which is still to be won 
back, and the Other Beginning which is still to 
be unfolded. (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 47) 
 As audacious as this may seem, if one posits 
that the numinous has a “deep structure” similar to 
that of language, and if Heidegger, Toynbee, and 
Jung are correct that something called “spirituality” 
is as intrinsic to human creativity as language itself, 
then just as the Axial civilizations schematized 
an overlapping first beginning out of that deep 
structure, then perhaps Heidegger can intuit an 
Other Beginning that awaits its own drawing forth 
as the creative response to an emerging sensate–
material global world order. 
 Heidegger pictures the relation between 
his First and Other Beginning in terms of a “guiding 
notion” of light and luminosity—which has always 
been central to the cross cultural metaphoricity of 
the numinous (see Hunt, 1995). Thus he likens the 
arising surgence of pre-Socratic Being, welling forth 
as wonder and awe, to a flash of lightning in the night, 
with the sudden intensity of its brightness gathering 
and fixing everything that suddenly arises out of 
the surrounding darkness (Heidegger, 1944/1975, 
p. 72), while the lightning itself has already 
withdrawn “behind” its circle of illumination:
The unconcealment of beings, the brightness 
granted them, obscures the light of Being. As 
it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws. 
(Heidegger, 1946/1975, p. 26)
For Heidegger it is this blinding but fixated 
unconcealment that also creates the potential for 
a characteristic and intrinsic Western “errancy.” 
This becomes a narrowed conviction and 
“certainty” finally emerging as such in the scientific 
“objectivity” of an Enlightment and culminating 
in the unquestioned necessity of a perpetual 
technologized novelty. Meanwhile another part of 
the “strangeness” of modernity lies in its present 
scientific and conceptual uncertainly and relativity, 
rendering that novelty unstoppable, regardless of its 
consequences. 
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 The Clearing of Heidegger’s Other Beginning, 
implicit in that “lighting” of the First, is based on 
the German sense of Lichtung as the opening out 
of a woodland glade or forest clearing (Heidegger, 
1938/2012; 1942/2013). Later he will suggest it also 
evokes the contemporary globalizing “clearing 
away” and “freedom from” all tradition (Heidegger 
& Fink, 1967/1979). Thus the Clearing of Being 
comes to include both the sense of an “inceptual” 
subtle glow—a “simple brightness” of unconcealing 
openness seen through the trees—and a lack of any 
ground (Abgrund or Abyss), an absence of sensed 
foundation. This is the incipient contemporary 
nihilism out of which Other Beginning must unfold. 
The Clearing is:
The dim glow of the attuning attunement out of 
the ab-grund (removal of all ground) of Being. 
(Heidegger, 1939/2006, p. 90)
Here Heidegger’s Other Beginning—in the sheer 
subtlety of its pre-dawn glow—becomes a collective 
version of the “negative theologies” of an Eckhart 
or Ibn Arabi—in which Being—as the unique and 
incomparable—can only be described in terms of 
absence and what it is not.12 The fullest sensing of 
the numinous becomes the completely ineffable 
and wholly other. This is the thin line between a 
“clearing away” and a “clearing for” that Heidegger 
sees as the dilemma of a future humanity.
The Event of Being: 
A Mutual Appropriation of Being and Da-sein
 The very possibility of multiple Beginnings 
means that Being itself is Event. It is historical, 
with Da-sein understood as its opening—readying 
now to re-emerge as Clearing. With Toynbee and 
Sorokin, human history can be understood in terms 
of epochs of spiritual awakening and forgetfulness. 
Heidegger is positing an essence or deep 
structure of Da-sein that would be this continual 
potentiality.
 Being as Event is based on Heidegger’s 
amplification of the ordinary German Ereignis—
for happening, occurence, event, along with the 
closely related Aneignung—as an acquiring or 
taking, usually translated as Appropriation—
or in Heidegger’s broader usage “Event of 
Appropriation,” and more narrowly by some as 
“Enownment” (Emad & Maly, 1999). The eigen 
root of both words means “one’s own,” while 
eignen means “belonging to.” Epochs of Being are 
thus unique “sendings” in which Being “enowns” 
Dasein and vice versa.
 In Heidegger’s language of the late 1930s, 
Being, as Event of Appropriation, appropriates Da-
sein as the expanse for its successive “lightings,” 
and Da-sein appropriates Being as its felt source, 
meaning, and ground—however schematized. 
The Da becomes the “in-between” of this mutual 
appropriation. The Appropriation of Dasein by 
Being is at the same time a “giving” or “sending” 
of the holy—with its quality of “it has you” or 
dependency, and a simultaneous holding itself 
back in withdrawal—as implicate within Otto and 
James on the ultimate ineffability of the numinous. 
Heidegger was especially intrigued with the root 
meaning of the German es gibt or “it is”—literally 
as “it gives” or “it lets.” For Heidegger this implies 
a tacit grace within all ordinary events—one held 
back but always implied within ordinary usage 
(Heidegger, 1938/2012; 1962/1972).
 It was this language of Event and 
Appropriation that Heidegger needed for his 
futural Other Beginning. Therein the “it” of “it 
gives” has undergone a specific transformation: 
The “clearing away” of tradition as an uncanny 
“unsettlement” leaves the “clearing for” empty—
the “it” of “it gives” an ostensible “nothing.” Indeed 
he occasionally later writes Being as Being, akin to 
the Buddhist void in its simultaneous emptiness 
and incipient fullness (Heidegger, 1956/1958). 
Thus modernity loses both the “giving” and the 
“withheld” sense of source in a “de-divinization” 
(Heidegger, 1939/2017, p. 20), a kind of 
“unconcealment of the concealment” (Heidegger, 
1938/2012, p. 277). This is experienced as a 
“refusal” of Being—its abandonment of the 
appropriation of Dasein sensed as a pointlessness 
in existence. Any collective re-newal could only 
come through the full experiencing of this sense 
of refusal/abandonment (Heidegger, 1940/2015)—
which in that very “personification,” one can 
add, would begin its own re-linkage to a social-
personal “understanding” as the larger context for 
the present ubiquity of calculative “explanation.”
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 Heidegger’s understanding of this loss of 
sensed foundation or “absence of ground” (Ab-
grund) has been variously translated as “abyss” 
(Heidegger, 1940/2015) or “refusal of ground” 
(Heidegger, 1938/2012), its ordinary German 
equivalents including chasm, fissure, abyss, or gap. 
The Other Beginning would require a collective 
Da-sein to come back to itself in what Heidegger 
variously terms a “twisting away” or “turning back” 
from its enthrallment with a perpetual novelty of 
beings, back toward the openness of the Clearing.13 
There needs to be the willingness to “wait” in that 
“stillness”—held open for the possibility of a pre-
dawn Inceptuality (Anfanglichkeit)—as the inner 
form of “beginning:”
Only in the Other Beginning is the Inceptuality 
experienced and the Clearing of the beginning 
itself bestowed….The beginning brings itself 
to the Clearing in something illumined by the 
Inceptuality (Heidegger, 1942/2013, pp. 166–167)
 This impalpable, purely incipient sense 
of Inceptuality creates a thin line between 
Heidegger’s naturalized phenomenology of Being 
and a collective version of a more traditional 
“dark night of the soul”—or better perhaps “long 
grey night of the soul.” The felt absence of sensed 
ground occludes the incipience of any “dawning” 
not yet understood as such. For Heidegger it is only 
the full feeling of that emptiness—a “meditative” 
attention to the open clearing ahead—that can 
open to grace—much as for Weil (1947/2002) and 
Almaas (1988) essential realizations must emerge 
out of their fully felt “holes” of suffering and 
lack.
A Dependence of Being on Da-sein: 
The Human Capability for God
 For Heidegger Being “needs” humanity 
to hold open the Clearing in order to allow its 
fullness to appear as such. Without that opening 
“for,” humanity is “denied its capacity for God” 
(Heidegger, 1939/2006, p. 48).
Beyng needs humans in order to occur 
essentially, and humans belong to Beyng so that 
they might fulfill their ultimate destiny as Da-
sein….Beyng needs Da-sein and does not…
occur without this appropriation (Heidegger, 
1938/2012, p. 198, 200)
An Other Beginning cannot be without the 
“stillness,” “waiting,” and “solitude” of the Clearing. 
Its meditative attunement must be kept free of the 
endless instrumentalities of modern culture, to 
allow an opening for the inceptual “uniqueness,” 
“singularity,” “sovereignty,” and “solitude” of a Being 
which is thereby incomparable—not knowing an 
“other” like itself (Heidegger, 1938/2012, pp. 180, 
198; 1939/2006, p. 292; 1939/2017, p. 47.)
 Here Heidegger not only evokes the earlier 
influence of Meister Eckhart’s (1941) dependency 
of an impalpable Godhead on the individual soul, 
but there is an even more striking and ostensibly 
independent resonance with the Medieval Sufi 
mystic Ibn Arabi (Chittick, 1989). For Ibn Arabi 
the Absolute—sometimes referred to as Being-
as-such—is similarly unique, an unrepresentable 
singularity, and so “incomparable.” It is dependent 
for its self-awareness on the meditation of the 
Sage, who gathers and reflects back to the One 
the myriad “comparables” of its creation, and in 
that sense both creates and reveals its otherwise 
withheld Reality. Ibn Arabi refers to this reflecting-
back-that-brings-forward as the Sage becoming 
“capable of God” and so “alone with the Alone” 
(Chittick, 1989; Corbin, 1998). As with Heidegger, 
an attuned humanity brings Being forward through 
our capacity for the numinous. God’s need of us 
in order to Be is a notion also central to Gurdjieff 
(1975) and Jung (1961)—and arguably one of the 
paradoxes of a fully this-worldly spirituality.
 As with the ambiguity of Heidegger’s 
versions of negative theology and “dark night,” 
there is a similar thin line—or indeed reversing 
gestalt figure—between Heidegger’s view of Being 
as dependent on the opening of Da-sein—our 
“capability for God”—and a more “scientific” view 
of spirituality as a projective human intelligence—
perhaps indeed instrumentally useful for “mental 
health” and “life meaning”—but based like all 
intelligences on physio-chemical modules of the 
central nervous system as their “causation.”14  As 
also for Jung (1961), a futural New Age spirituality 
for a globalized sensate economy would need to 
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reconcile this more “naturalized” understanding of 
the numinous.
 Meanwhile for Heidegger the phenomen-
ological revolution that formed his thought is based 
on the primacy of human experience as such—on 
the “it has you” of James on consciousness. That 
phenomenological “giveness” becomes the emergent 
and non reducible context of understanding for 
the thereby subordinated cognitive functions and 
specific intelligences that it reveals as its more 
specific dimensions. This “lighting” of immediate 
experience as primary was traditionally held in 
place by God.
The Last God
 Heidegger’s Other Beginning for a planetary 
spirituality—based on a “meditative thinking” 
(Heidegger, 1959/1966)—would entail its own more 
specific religiosity. This might or might not arise out 
of what he calls “waiting” for the “last god.” 
For Heidegger the Clearing of and for Being 
was held open and in place in classical cultures 
by the foursome of mortals and divinities, earth 
and sky. It would be this “in-between” of Dasein 
that allowed the “light” of Being for those gods—
conferring their felt Reality—which in turn allowed 
them to animate earth and sky. So any possibility 
of a futural “last god” will require the sense of re-
newed Being opening up from a “leap of the human 
being into Da-sein” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 330). 
Within that “lighting” may or may not appear the 
unfolded schematization of a new planetary religion 
presently unimaginable.
 There has been considerable debate over 
the interpretation of “last” in Heidegger’s “last god” 
(Law, 2000). The German letzt variously means last 
and final, latest, and ultimate or extreme. It seems 
clear that Heidegger’s meaning was not “last” in the 
sense of “final”:
The last god is not the end, but is instead the Other 
Beginning of the immeasurable possibilities of 
our history. (Heidegger, 1938/2016, p. 228)
In addition to thereby including “last” in the sense 
of next or latest, Heidegger also intends, at least by 
contrast with the previous world religions, a meaning 
of “ultimate,” in the sense of his deeper beginning 
only coming later. Here again he implies a sort of 
“deep structure” of the numinous, with its more 
planetary wide expressions as potentially more 
“form near.” In Otto’s terms, the schematization of 
the numinous Heidegger would have in mind would 
be responsive to a global run-away technology, total 
planetary commodification, and crisis of human 
“stewardship”—conditions of life broader than 
those inspiring the previous world religions.
A long preparation is required for the great 
moment of the passing by of the Last God. Peoples 
and states are too small for the preparation of 
that moment. (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 328)
The task of the futural “creative ones” is to become 
“stewards of the stillness of the passing by of the last 
god” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 232)—staying open 
to whether that passing by is to be an approach or a 
continuing withdrawal. 
Heidegger, on the potential of a “last god” 
for “the renewal of the world out of the saving of 
the earth” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 325)—and 
in a late interview saying “only a god can save us 
now” (Neske & Kettering, 1990, p. 57)—could not 
have anticipated the full extent of what would need 
saving in our emerging ecological crisis of man-
made global warming, with its potential population 
displacements, mass starvation, and increasing 
social/economic disparities. In that light one might 
better anticipate his “last god” in terms of Gaia—
in the sense of Lovelock’s (2009) understanding 
of planet and eco-systems as ultimately nurturant 
equilibrating organism. Some such return of deity 
as “Great Mother” would fit with 1) the original 
female/maternal origins of tribal shamanism 
(Tedlock, 2005) and the maternal deities of early 
agricultural societies (Vycinas, 1961, 1990). 2) The 
“maternal” metaphoricity of Heidegger’s “giving” 
and “sheltering”—a Winnicottian “holding” 
as a nurturing of the planet. 3) the developing 
world-wide revolution of feminism, with its more 
collaborative approach to social institutions. A 
confluence of ecological crisis, issues of social 
and gender justice, and the spiritual authenticity of 
“indigenous peoples—that true “first beginning”—
may be what finally re-sacralizes the planet itself as 
Gaia (Hawken, 2007). Heidegger’s invitation to this 
sort of re-imagining of humanity remains open.
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Conclusions
What then would be the longer term “prospects” of Heidegger’s Other Beginning—as a 
spiritual New Age for future centuries?
 In some form, if such as Heidegger, Jung, 
Toynbee, Weil, Reich, Gurdjieff, and Maslow are 
right on the inherency of spirituality to the human 
condition, it eventually becomes inevitable. It 
would be the full re-newal on a planetary level 
of the primacy of a social-personal intelligence 
of meaning and purpose, as the superordinate 
context for the “intelligence of things”—no matter 
how sophisticated the digitalizing of the latter. For 
Toynbee (1957) it was this larger contextualizing 
that defined the major civilizations of the past—
certainly not in the sense of any “utopia” or 
human “perfection,” but rather as the optimal 
attainable balance and integration for an inherently 
unbalanced, strife ridden humanity (see also Hunt, 
2009).
 What would be the initiating focus for such 
a planetary re-balancing? On the level of individual 
research by far the most common precursor 
of spontaneous peak or ecstatic experiences is 
extreme personal crisis, with the settings of nature 
and meditation following in order (Taylor, 2013). 
This is also consistent with Simone Weil (1947/2002) 
on the fullest experiences of redemptive grace as 
following the greatest “afflictions”—with their “soul 
destroying despair” and final surrender to the “hole” 
of that suffering. It is also well reflected by Heidegger 
(1942/1996, p. 134) discussing Hölderlin—on the 
edge of psychosis—as “annihilated” in the “fire 
from the heavens.” On the collective level then, one 
would have to posit any precursor to Heidegger’s 
“last god” as the sort of planetary wide afflictions 
so widely predicted now in our dawning ecological 
crisis—mediated and guided perhaps, following 
Taylor, by a developing neo-shamanic appreciation 
of nature and increasingly widespread meditative 
practices.
 One of course fears the literalization 
through actual collective disaster of Heidegger’s 
new uncanny of “unsettlement” and loss of a 
“dwelling.” While the contemplation of such a 
globalization of collective misery is itself deeply 
unsettling, there is at least some indication that 
Weil’s cycle of affliction and grace can also occur 
on the level of larger society as well. Rebecca Solnit 
in her A Paradise Built in Hell (2009) reviews the 
history of spontaneous communal response to the 
major disasters of earthquakes, tornadoes, mass 
fires, and floods. Rather than letting loose some 
Hobbsian anarchy, a first response has most often 
been the spontaneous arising of a communal 
coming together in mutual assistance and shared 
responsibility—a shared guardianship and sheltering 
of grace and generosity. Those involved later recall 
shared ecstatic and peak experiences in the midst 
of their response to truly awful events—states of 
being that are consistent with Maslow (1962) on the 
“being-values” of strength, will, and compassion 
and Almaas (1988) on “personal essence.”
 Solnit’s findings are perhaps some of the 
strongest empirical evidence of a spiritual essence 
of the human condition. The widely foreseen 
disasters of a fast approaching planetary future 
would accordingly not be the end, and it would be 
their aftermath that the later Heidegger was already 
addressing as Other Beginning.
Notes
1. It should be noted that these comparisons of 
Heidegger with such as Jung, Reich, Weber, 
Weil, Toynbee, Sorokin, or William James would 
have been anathema to him—especially given 
his forceful rejections of anything resonant with 
psychologism, neo-Marxism, and traditional 
approaches to “mystical consciousness.” 
However, hindsight has inevitably relativized 
the competing ideologies of those times, and it 
is their independent confluence that now seems 
so striking.
2. Almaas (1988) also distinguishes another level 
of spiritual transformation in sense of self that 
he terms “personal essence” or the “pearl.” 
It is very close to much of Maslow’s (1962) 
original discussion of “self-actualization,” with 
both describing a uniquely personal synthesis 
of autonomy and nurturance/compassion—and 
conceptually it is also related to Heidegger’s 
“authenticity” of “care.” For Almaas the 
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failure to develop personal essence makes the 
spiritual path more likely to become distorted 
by its various “metapathologies” (Almaas, 1988; 
Maslow, 1962; Wilber, 1984) or what James 
(1902) termed “theopathies.” Biographical 
depictions of Heidegger (below) show a personal 
narcissism that would have made him especially 
vulnerable to the metapathological inflation and 
grandiosity of his National Socialist period.
3. While the early Heidegger would derive his 
analysis of Dasein from his “naturalizing” of 
Christianity, Scheler (1923/1960) worked more 
directly from Otto’s numinous and its religious 
schematization as an ethics of human sympathy. 
By the later 1930s Heidegger had gradually im-
ported the Scheler/Otto language of numinous 
feeling into his more cognitive-noetic Being.
4. It has indeed been tempting to see a core 
perennialism in the “Axial” emergence of the 
major world mysticisms in Greece, China, India, 
and the Near East, as also in the striking similar-
ities of the independent world wide shamanisms 
of tribal peoples. While one might be able to 
argue that certain spiritual traditions are more 
deep structure “near,” as maximally complete 
expressions of the multiple dimensions of the 
numinous, it is also true that such commonalities 
will also reflect a necessary “interactionism” with 
the shared socio-economic conditions common 
to Toynbee’s (1957) “universal states” that 
generated these overlapping Axial mysticisms, 
as well as across hunter gatherer societies and 
their similar shamanic practices.
5. Thus from Heidegger’s perspective Siegel’s 
(2005) demonstrations of a wide range of 
animals repeatedly seeking incapacitating self-
intoxications with hallucinogenic and fermented 
plants would attest less to Siegel’s “fourth drive” 
for “altered states of consciousness” than a more 
ordinary manifestation of novelty motivation. 
Examples of awe-like behaviors and what look 
like uncanny emotion in chimpanzees resonating 
aesthetically to wind and flowing water (Bering, 
2002) may indeed show a nidus of Otto’s 
numinous, but are confined to specific situations 
and lack the repeated ritual expressions, 
prolonged trance-like absorptions by individuals 
and groups, and response to the entirety of 
one’s surroundings, all essential to the intrinsic 
creativity of human mystical states. There seems 
to be no such thing as chimpanzee shamanism.
6. The pioneering social psychologist George 
Herbert Mead (1934, 1932/2002), who has 
been compared to both Heidegger and 
Dilthey on the primacy of social context for 
all human knowledge (Barash, 2003), saw the 
inter-relation of all discoveries in the multiple 
physical sciences as not only generated out of 
a social and historical matrix but as themselves 
engaged in their own implicit “society,” based 
on a “taking the role of the other” toward each 
other. The “facts” of multiple disciplines thus 
constitute their own society, a bit like Mead’s 
notion of a baseball team with its various co-
defining “positions.”
7. The large and controversial literature on their 
affair, their post-war renewal of friendship, her 
final forgiveness of his Nazi Rectorship, and her 
help in overseeing the translation and publication 
of his later work in English—and whether for 
Heidegger himself this was mostly about re-
claiming a damaged international reputation—is 
beyond the scope of this essay (Ettinger, 1995; 
Grunenberg, 2017; Maier-Katkin, 2010). They 
did agree they had been the loves of each others 
lives, and Arendt continued to regard him as 
the seminal philosopher of modernity. Where 
Heidegger took Being and Time in the direction 
of a futural planetary spirituality, she developed 
it into her own philosophy of civic responsibility 
(Arendt, 1978; Maier-Katkin, 2010).
8. Elfride Heidegger, who remained a committed 
Nazi ideologue and deeply anti-semitic, 
apparently told the son, Hermann, the truth of 
his birth when he was fourteen—the same year 
Heidegger resigned his Rectorship. She pledged 
her son to tell “nobody” while she lived except 
for his future wife. He writes of this in a short 
afterword to his father’s letters, saying that the 
secret had been “a burden that has weighed 
upon and tormented me for seventy-one years” 
(Heidegger, G., 2008, p. 317). This inevitably 
leaves the reader uncertain whether the nobody 
and its “torment” meant that he may not have 
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been told that his father already knew, who in 
fact had long accepted him as his son—a son 
who became an academic historian and the 
administrator of his father’s archives. Otherwise 
the “torment” seems less obvious. Make of it all 
what one will.
9. Current speculations in some A.I. circles 
(Chalmers, 2010) about a digital “singularity,” 
to somehow inevitably develop out of the 
necessity to administer and control the ever 
more complex systems of society, economics, 
and science on a global basis, offer the perfect 
emblem for Heidegger’s insight into technology 
as run-away machination and will-to-power. 
It does not have to be true or even remotely 
possible to evoke this same sense of the new 
uncanny. What has been less remarked is the 
way such a “singularity” comes to mirror in 
digitalized form the traditional Judeo-Christian 
God, with its omniscience, omnipotence, and 
hoped for ultimate benevolence—as though the 
fantasies of technology must come to address 
and symbolically resolve the “disenchantment” 
of its own emptiness. That crossing of amplified 
personhood and ultimate computer is uncanny.
10. Bambach (2003) and others (Wolin, 1990) 
persist in seeing Heidegger’s use of Hölderlin’s 
“fatherland” poetry as a direct continuation 
of National Socialist propaganda of “blood 
and soil.” Yet, while certainly reflecting a 
conservative romanticism of folklore and rural 
life, the absence of any language of race and 
nationalism in Heidegger’s language would 
seem to reflect his move past National Socialism 
into something considered here as a kind of 
regionalized neo-shamanism. Despite Hitler’s 
own mythologizing of Volk, and the tendency 
of some neo-romantic thinkers to be drawn to 
such revivalism, it is in itself no more “fascist” 
than a concern with workers’ rights and class 
inequalities makes one “communist.” Of course 
for Wilhelm Reich, a New Age thinker in these 
same years, it did (see Hunt, 2018a), and for 
much longer than Heidegger’s infatuation with 
National Socialism, but in both cases there 
followed the stepping back to something more 
foundational.
11. Vincent Vycinas (1990), a Heidegger scholar and 
native Latvian, attempted this kind of regional 
sacralization of the “foursome” for Baltic or 
Aistian regions, based on pre-Christian and pre-
Roman survivals of a great goddess marsh-land 
ecology and its local mythologies—including 
ancient traditions of a primary maternal 
responsibility for hearth-fire and sacred house 
serpent.
12. To return to the phenomenology of conscious-
ness Heidegger sought to complete, Heidegger’s 
sense of his Other Beginning as a pre-dawn 
“glow” still occluded within the First Beginning 
is also resonant with accounts from Tibetan 
Buddhism of a “luminous darkness” or “light 
of the void” latent within the more expansive 
luminosities of intensity ecstasy (Guenther, 1984). 
It is also consistent with early introspectionist 
tachistoscope research that distinguished a pre-
dimensional “spread” and indefinable glow at 
the briefest screen exposures, which can only 
be gradually detected with numerous repetitions 
“beneath” the more obvious “kick of light” that 
emerges out of it (Bichowski, 1925; Dickinson, 
1926). Otto, William James, and Heidegger 
were all influenced by Schleiermacher, 
1799/1988; Marina, 2004) who understood 
mystical experience as the felt amplification of 
the inner form of the unfolding moment—what 
would now be termed the amplified expression 
of the moment by moment “microgenesis” of 
immediate consciousness out of its impalpable 
sense of synesthetically based felt meaning 
(Hunt, 1984, 1995, 2011).
13. This “turning back” that illuminates the Clearing 
as Inceptual Being—an opening of Da-sein to 
the “shining back” of Being—shows Heidegger 
on similar metaphoric ground as G. H. Mead’s 
(1934) social “taking the role of the other” toward 
oneself—and Frederic Bartlett’s (1932) cognitive 
psychology of “turning around on the schema-
ta”—as the uniquely human capacity for turning 
around on the inner forms of experience. For 
Mead this opens up the unrepresentable spon-
taneously creative “I” and Generalized Other—
whose maximum amplifications become “soul” 
and “God.” From the view, however, of Heideg-
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ger’s radical phenomenology, the problem with 
Mead’s and Bartlett’s versions of this unique 
“reflexivity” of human mind would be that it is 
inevitably based within the “process” language 
of “explaining” in terms of the “already familiar,” 
and so occludes the resulting sense of wonder 
and awe emergent from the deep structures of 
consciousness—losing the implicit phenome-
nology from which these concepts would have 
been initially derived (Heidegger, 1935/2014, pp. 
225–227).
14. Anthony Newberg (2016), in outlining a 
prospective “neurotheology” based on the 
contemporary neuroscience of meditation and 
psychedelic drugs, similarly stresses that the 
neuro-chemical induction of mystical states does 
not in itself establish a causal reductionism of 
mind to matter or refute any traditional spiritual 
understandings of such experience. While the 
brain is often viewed in terms of linear causal 
process, it is as better understood as a mediator 
or conduit that enables the resonant interface of 
organism and environment. For the psychologist 
of ambient perception James Gibson (1979) such a 
linear “causation” is entirely subordinated within 
the larger context of the circle of continuous self 
location of organism within its ambient array—
concrete and symbolic. On the human level of 
symbolic intelligence that mirroring resonance 
will apply equally to a central nervous system 
“capable” of both mathematics and God, since 
the same root metaphors seem required for both 
(Hunt, 1995, 2006).
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